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IT'S TIME TO PRIVATIZE
E.S. Savas*
I. Introduction
New York is a paradox. It is exciting and vibrant, a mecca for
immigrants seeking the American dream and an incubator of innova-
tive entrepreneurs. At the same time, the quality of life for most New
Yorkers is mediocre and getting worse. Schools are failing, crime is
commonplace, streets are filthy, transportation is a test of endurance,
drug addiction is a curse, teenage pregnancy is rampant, public inci-
vility and foul language are the norm, ugliness assails the senses,
housing is in short supply and derelicts line the streets. Millions of
New Yorkers have fled the city over the past twenty years because
their intuitive calculus revealed that they could get a higher quality of
life and better schooling for their children in the suburbs.
For too long, New Yorkers have prided themselves on an ability to
muddle through, to temporize and to survive, smug in the unques-
tioned belief that New York is resilient enough to overcome any
amount of municipal and civic irresponsibility and to rebound from
adversity. New Yorkers have assumed that their city is immune to
the forces of history that have reduced the great cities of antiquity to
dusty sites of archeological digs. But New York is not immune. It is
losing ground to foreign and domestic competitors and to other cities
who have strived to achieve world stature.
The fundamental failure is New York City government. Many ask
why city government does not seem to work in New York and why its
performance seems so inept, regardless of who is mayor. City govern-
ment always seems to promise too much and achieve too little; in try-
ing to placate every pressure group, it undertakes a wide array of
functions almost irrespective of their cost or feasibility. It maintains a
costly municipal hospital system that is a tribute to noble intentions
but merely provides inadequate service for the poor. It promises
cheap housing but creates a "temporary" housing shortage that has
lasted for forty-five years and has driven up the cost of the little hous-
ing that has been built. It promises safe streets but turns hardened
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criminals loose even before the arresting officer completes all the
paperwork and gets back on patrol.
In media-rich New York, politicians have learned that credit ac-
crues for detecting problems, pointing to alleged culprits, posturing in
public and making symbolic but costly gestures to demonstrate the
depth of their commitment to newly discovered causes of yet more
interest groups. Capital construction has particular political appeal,
and sometimes funds are spent on highly visible projects, even when
there is no money to operate or maintain them. Woodhull Hospital in
Brooklyn is a sad case in point, the hospital was built at great expense
and then mothballed for years before it opened. The bias toward capi-
tal spending and against maintenance expenditures is understandable,
considering the high visibility of the former and the near invisibility of
the latter. Capital budgets create political capital and cement political
ties. A ground-breaking or ribbon-cutting for a new structure is an
opportunity for crowds, speeches, photographs, media coverage and
wine-and-cheese receptions where the flesh of potential campaign con-
tributors can be pressed. In contrast, it is difficult to organize a cere-
mony to celebrate the prompt repair of a leaky sewer or the long-
overdue painting of a bridge. Moreover, capital projects cost the in-
cumbent only three cents on the dollar, assuming a municipal bond
with a thirty-year term is used to pay for construction - leaving suc-
cessors to foot the bill for the remaining ninety-seven cents.
That myriad and ever-changing special-interest groups tempt dem-
ocratically elected public officials to overextend themselves is not
unique to New York. Governments in many places and at all levels
have suffered from a loss of public confidence, even as they have
grown and prospered and even as people seem to accept the implicit
claim that government is omnipotent, capable of solving all their
problems.
In fact, government is severely limited in what it can do to address
the underlying problems of New York, although well-meaning politi-
cians have squandered lots of money on programs that purport to do
so. By "underlying problems," I mean drug and alcohol addiction,
teenage pregnancy, motherhood without marriage and failure to finish
school. Together these scourges produce generations of poor unfortu-
nates who lead short and brutal lives on the outer margins of society,
unable to participate in the world of work and doomed to a parasitic
existence on the fruits of the labor of others - with the fruits picked
legally through welfare, broadly defined, or illegally through crime.
By and large, only private institutions - family, church, neighbor-
hood - can change these destructive personal behavior patterns.
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Meanwhile, bad government social programs drive out good private
ones, just as bad money drives out good. Consider the Catholic
Church in Brooklyn which, after ten years, closed its shelter for
homeless men because the city government opened a shelter nearby.'
The men chose the city shelter rather than the private one because the
latter required them to give up drugs, clean themselves up, put on
fresh clothes it provided and go to work at one of the jobs it found for
them, while the city shelter required no such change in behavior.
Surely, the private program was infinitely better than the government
one.
To survive and thrive, New York needs "perestroika." A restruc-
turing of government in New York should begin with the same basic
premise that drove the vision in the former Soviet Union and in the
newly freed nations of Central and Eastern Europe. We must rethink
and redraw the boundary line between government and the rest of
society, between the public and private sectors. The relative roles of
government and society's other institutions should be sorted out. For
example, what is it that the city government can and should be re-
sponsible for? What is it that it cannot do and should not pretend it
can? What can society handle through other means? How can city
government take advantage of other, private-sector institutions?
The private institutions available to address society's needs include,
first and foremost, the family, which is the original department of
health, education, welfare, housing and human services. The second
component of the private sector is the marketplace, with its market
forces, comprised of firms, entrepreneurs and would-be entrepreneurs.
Finally, the third component is the whole array of voluntary group-
ings: churches, businesses, unions, civic and neighborhood associa-
tions, charities and nonprofit associations of all kinds, many unique to
the United States. As Alexis de Tocqueville noted with wonder 150
years ago in Democracy In America, these institutions can be sum-
moned - or allowed - once again to play a greater role and relieve
city government of some of its insupportable burden, thereby enabling
government to do well those things that only government can do. Lo-
cal government must relax its grip, for its well intentioned bear hug
has turned into a stranglehold.
Privatization is the key to enable New York to better utilize its
private sector. Misunderstood, maligned and sometimes feared,
privatization, simply stated, means relying more on private institu-
tions and less on government to satisfy people's needs. Joining neigh-
1. Esther Iverem, A Church in Brooklyn Closes Its Men's Shelter, N.Y. TIMES, Apr.
18, 1987, at 23.
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borhood safety patrols instead of clamoring for more police officers is
an example of privatization at work. Leasing Bryant Park2 to a fran-
chisee who will keep it clean, attractive and free of muggers, addicts
and pushers is a form of privatization, as is" allowing free-market vans
to serve commuters' transportation needs. Prudent contracting with
private firms to operate buses, repair police cars and sweep the streets,
as well as contracting with not-for-profit churches to deliver "meals-
on-wheels" to elderly shut-ins or to operate halfway houses, are ways
to privatize. Food stamps and housing vouchers for the poor are suc-
cessful examples of privatization's success in overcoming the ineffi-
ciencies of government-run farms, grocery stores and public-housing
ghettos. The New York Times opts for privatization when it chooses a
home-delivery service instead of the U.S. Postal Service to deliver the
morning paper. Strengthening and relying more on the family, reli-
gious institutions and aroused local groups to help tackle the
problems of teenage pregnancy and drug addiction are other illustra-
tions of privatization. Selling JFK and LaGuardia Airports and
franchising the East River bridges (yes, in effect selling the Brooklyn
Bridge!) to toll-collecting private firms that will rehabilitate and main-
tain them, exemplify privatization. These are not abdications by gov-
ernment, but rather realistic acknowledgements that democratic
government can go only so far in dealing with certain problems. In
light of these shortcomings, it is time to acknowledge that the private
sector can be a more effective and more efficient provider of badly
needed municipal services.
II. Why Privatize?
A. Privatization and Productivity
More taxes and worse services. For many New Yorkers this has
been the net effect of government policies over many years. Now,
however, public opposition to higher taxes coupled with public de-
mands for better services are causing local officials to consider new
approaches. After all, one can always rely on New York City govern-
ment to make the right decision - but usually after exhausting every
other conceivable alternative.
The policy choices are not limited to raising taxes or cutting serv-
ices.' There is a third way: increasing government productivity, that
is, giving the taxpayers more for their money. While the concept of
increased productivity has plenty of appeal, the fact remains that con-
2. Bryant Park is adjacent to the New York Public Library on 42nd Street, east of
Sixth Avenue.
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ventional management reforms to increase government productivity
generally have only modest and short-lived effects. A more funda-
mental strategy is needed to produce permanent productivity im-
provements, keep taxes in check and improve services. The proven
productivity strategy is privatization by competitive contracting for
municipal services. This form of privatization is being carried out at
federal, state, county and local levels and is non-partisan: Democratic
and Republican governors, mayors, legislators and town councils are
privatizing a broad variety of public services. Moreover, privatization
has occurred in center cities and in suburbs, implemented by black,
white and Hispanic elected officials.
Government services are often costly and poor not because the peo-
ple who work in government are inferior to those who work in the
private sector; they are not. It is because monopoly is generally infer-
ior to competition in providing high-quality, low-cost goods and serv-
ices, and most government activities are unnecessarily organized and
run as monopolies. Privatization, when properly carried out, gives
public officials and the public a choice, which fosters competition and
leads to more cost-effective performance. By dissolving unnecessary
public monopolies and introducing competition in the delivery of pub-
lic services, privatization will thus enable the public to benefit from
competition-promoting procedures.
The ideal approach, now being practiced in numerous places in the
United States, Canada and Great Britain, is to let private firms and
public agencies compete against each other. Recent legislation in Eng-
land requires governments to let private firms bid against entrenched
public monopolies.3 Similarly, the Colorado State Legislature man-
dated competitive contracting for twenty percent of Denver's bus
routes.4 The City of Newark, New Jersey, is saving millions of dollars
annually through a similar program. The key to the success of such
programs is honest and fair competition between public agencies and
private firms, with an impartial third party ensuring that the full cost
of the public agency is compared to the total cost of the private
alternative.
Privatization by "contracting out" is not new. Five hundred years
ago Queen Isabella of Spain hired a private contractor _. a foreigner
at that - to explore a new route to the Indies, even though she might
3. See Peter Young, Experiences in Britain, in PRIVATIZATION FOR NEW YORK:
COMPETING FOR A BETTER FUTURE, REPORT OF THE NEW YORK STATE SENATE AD-
VISORY COMMISSION ON PRIVATIZATION (E.S. Savas ed., 1992).
4. Karen Brown, Private Bus Lines On Comeback Trail; Denver and Other Big Cities
Make Partial Return to Non-Public Operations, WASH. POST, Nov. 28, 1989, at A3.
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have used the Spanish Navy or the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. What
is new is using contracting out as a deliberate, systematic, comprehen-
sive strategy to improve government performance. Today, New York
is a laggard in adopting this proven strategy.
III. The Evidence on Privatization
The reasons behind the growing popularity of contracting out are
purely pragmatic. When carried out sensibly, this alternative leads to
greater productivity and therefore enables governments to provide the
same level of services at lower cost or to improve services without
raising taxes. The evidence that privatization works is overwhelming
and unambiguous and is clear from its widespread growth in the face
of opposition by public employee unions. Methods to allay the under-
standable fears of public employees and gain their support, even if
only grudging, are discussed below.
Contracting out has been growing by almost five percent a year, 5
and has been the focus of numerous studies including surveys of pub-
lic officials, before-and-after studies and cross-sectional studies. Sum-
maries of the various methodologies and results are discussed below.
A. Surveys of Public Officials
The fact that contracting out is commonplace and growing indi-
cates by itself that, on the whole, public officials are satisfied with its
effectiveness. Surveys corroborate this intuitive assessment. Two
early surveys of government officials showed that about sixty percent
of responding officials considered contracting out to be less costly or
no more costly than in-house service. By a ratio of about four to one,
these officials considered the quality of contracted services to be at
least as good as in-house services.6
A larger, subsequent study in New Jersey found that public officials
were overwhelmingly satisfied with contract services. Only ten per-
cent or fewer were dissatisfied or had no opinion. Cost savings and in-
house limitations are the major reasons they cite for contracting out.7
A major nationwide survey conducted in 1987 provides further evi-
dence in support of contracting. Three-quarters of U.S. local govern-
5. See E.S. Savas, Privatization and Productivity, in PUBLIC PRODUCTIVITY HAND-
BOOK 79 (M. Holzer ed., 1992).
6. Patricia S. Florestano & Stephen B. Gordon, Private Provision of Public Services, 1
INT. JOUR. OF PUB. ADMIN. 307 (1979); Patricia S. Florestano & Stephen B. Gordon,
Public vs. Private.: Small Government Contracting with the Private Sector, 40 PUB. ADMIN.
REV. 29 (1980).
7. See EAGLETON INSTITUTE OF POLITICS, RUTGERS UNIVERSITY, ALTERNATIVE
METHODS FOR DELIVERING PUBLIC SERVICES IN NEW JERSEY (1986).
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ments that contract for services report that cost savings are an
advantage of contracting out. Of those governments, eleven percent
report savings of forty percent or more, forty percent report savings of
twenty percent or more, and eighty percent report savings of at least
ten percent.8
In analyzing contracting out, one can and should go beyond the
positive attitudes of public officials toward contracting out to examine
carefully executed, comprehensive, comparative studies of contracted
services. After all, privatization by contracting out might be no more
than a temporary enthusiasm, a fad not unlike many of the earlier
nostrums for improving productivity.
Today, a lengthy array of studies conclusively demonstrate that
contracted services cost less and compare in quality to corresponding
services produced in-house by government agencies. Two types of
studies lead to this conclusion: before-and-after studies and cross-sec-
tional studies.
1. Before-and-After Studies
The most common studies are before-and-after comparisons carried
out in individual jurisdictions. These studies contrast the cost and
quality of contractual service provided by a newly hired contractor to
the cost and quality of prior in-house work. Such comparisons are
numerous, easy to do and are carried out in the normal course of
events.
Before-and-after studies are subject to several limitations, however.
First, it is difficult to distinguish precisely between the effect of con-
tracting out and the impact of other changes that may have taken
place simultaneously, such as changes in service guidelines or a
changed operating environment. Second, routine comparisons are
sometimes not as systematic or professional as they should be. Third,
there is an inevitable reporting bias. When an in-house study con-
cludes that contracting out would cost more, without a commensurate
improvement, the decision to make no change is rarely reported. In
contrast, a study that leads to a decision to contract out will be
reported.
A fourth shortcoming of such simple comparisons is that they con-
trast an existing in-house service with service by a newly hired private
contractor. A commonly cited concern is that the first contract re-
sults from an artificially low bid, made in order to capture the service,
8. Irwin T. David, Privatization in America, in MUNICIPAL YEAR BOOK, Table 5/2
(International City Management Assoc. 1988).
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and that the price will subsequently be raised to a much higher level.
As discussed below, evidence contradicts this common belief and the
problem is easy to avoid. Finally, these simple comparisons can be
countered by finding and pointing to contrary instances, where a con-
tractor was replaced and the jurisdiction took over and began (or re-
sumed) doing the work in-house.
Having articulated these disclaimers, it is important to consider the
evidence behind them before dismissing the claim. Can so many dif-
ferent jurisdictions be wrong? Several large-scale experiences are wor-
thy of note. Over the eight-year period from 1979 to 1987, Los
Angeles County awarded 651 contracts for data conversion, grounds
maintenance and custodial, food, laundry and guard services. The
contracts totaled $182 million and saved the county $86 million from
its original in-house cost of $268 million. Los Angeles County's in-
house cost was forty-seven percent greater than the contract price or,
conversely, the contract savings amounted to thirty-two percent. A
total of 2700 positions were eliminated, or 3.6 percent of the county's
total.9 Los Angeles then expanded its privatization program even
more aggressively and a subsequent study two years later summarized
the county's ten years of experience. The study found that a total of
812 contracts costing $508 million resulted in savings of $193 million,
or twenty-eight percent. The streamlining process resulted in the
elimination of 4700 positions, or six percent of the total, yet this was
accomplished with only a handful of layoffs. I0 No information was
presented, however, on the relative quality of the work or on the cost
of contract administration and monitoring.
The U.S. General Accounting Office ("GAO") examined 1661 cost-
comparison studies conducted between 1978 and 1986 covering
twenty-five major types of commercial functions performed by the
Department of Defense." The original cost of performing the work
in-house was compared to the contractor bids and to lower-cost bids
made by in-house units that faced the threat of privatization. The
GAO found that the original cost had been thirty-seven percent
greater than the winning bid, and that an estimated $614 million had
been saved by this competitive process. 2
In addition to this study of studies, the federal government con-
9. See COUNTY OF Los ANGELES, REPORT ON CONTRACTING POLICY IN Los AN-
GELES COUNTY GOVERNMENT 40 (1987).
10. Id.
11. UNITED STATES GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, FEDERAL PRODUCTIVITY:
DOD FUNCTIONS WITH SAVINGS POTENTIAL FROM PRIVATE SECTOR COST COMPARI-
SONS, GAO/HRD-89-17 (1988).
12. Id.
[Vol. XIX
PRIVA TIZA TION
ducted detailed before-and-after comparisons of its contracts for com-
mercial services. The Office of Federal Procurement Policy studied
all 235 contracts awarded by one agency during a two-year period for
support activities such as data processing, food service and audio-vis-
ual services. 13 The study revealed that the cost of this work when
done in-house had been twenty-eight percent higher than the cost of
the contract work.14 A similar study of all 131 contracts awarded
over a subsequent one-year period showed that the contracts cost
$87.5 million but saved $43.9 million; that is, the in-house cost had
been fifty percent greater. 15  No data on comparative quality were
offered, nor were the costs of contract administration and monitoring
discussed. Moreover, the studies cover only the cases where contracts
were awarded; presumably there were many cases where no savings
could have been realized and, therefore, no contracting took place.
Thus, one cannot conclude from these Los Angeles and federal stud-
ies that all in-house services cost thirty-seven to fifty percent more
than comparable contract work. 16
2. Cross-Sectional Studies
Although the above experiences are useful and may influence
others, they do not give a complete picture. Comprehensive, cross-
sectional studies tend to provide more compelling evidence. These
deliberate studies compare in-house and contract services across sam-
ples of randomly chosen jurisdictions. While these studies are time
consuming, costly and difficult to carry out, a number of cross-sec-
tional studies have been carried out since 1975 and provide definitive
evidence on the efficiency of contracting for service.
The most extensive summary of these studies has covered solid
waste management, street sweeping, street repaving, traffic signal
maintenance, bus transportation, administrative services, custodial
work, tree maintenance, lawn maintenance and corrections. In short,
it costs about a third more to perform these services using in-house
forces than to use a contractor selected by competitive bidding, even
after including the cost of contract administration and monitoring."
13. OFFICE OF FEDERAL PROCUREMENT POLICY, U.S. OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT
AND BUDGET, ENHANCING GOVERNMENTAL PRODUCTIVITY THROUGH COMPETITION
(1984).
14. Id.
15. J.P. WADE, JR., REPORT TO CONGRESS: THE DOD COMMERCIAL ACTIVITIES
PROGRAM (Apr. 11, 1986).
16. E.S. SAVAS, PRIVATIZATION: THE KEY TO BETTER GOVERNMENT (1987).
17. Barbara J. Stevens, Comparing Public and Private-sector Productivity Efficiency:
An Analysis of Eight Activities, NAT. PRODUCTIVITY REV. 395-406 (1984).
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The above studies found the quality of the work to be the same for
both municipal and contract work.
While contracting out has been found to be generally superior to in-
house service provision, it does not follow that contracting out will be
advantageous in every case. Successful contracting out requires a de-
termination that a particular service be appropriate for an outside
contractor. In light of this, contracting out decisions should be made
prudently and under competitive conditions, and only after a careful
study to gauge the potential benefits. In addition, privatization deci-
sions should be followed-up by effective monitoring.
B. The Sources of Productivity Gains
The productivity improvements resulting from contracting out are
substantial. If the cost of those public services averages a third more
than the price of contract services, the implication is that the price of
the latter is twenty-five percent less than the cost of the former. In
economic terms, the same output is achieved with twenty-five percent
fewer inputs - a significant increase in productivity.
Generally speaking, the productivity gains through contracting out
do not result from low wages; they result from more work performed
per employee per unit time. After extensive studies of ten municipal
services, Stevens concluded that the following factors do not account
for the observed cost difference: salaries, fringe benefits or service
quality. No statistically significant difference could be found between
municipal and contract employees."8
The observed cost difference is accounted for by the fact that con-
tractors (1) provide less paid time off for their employees (less vaca-
tion time and fewer paid absences); (2) use part-time and lower-skilled
workers where possible; (3) are more likely to hold their managers
responsible for equipment maintenance as well as worker activities;
(4) are more likely to give their first-line managers the authority to
hire and fire workers and to reward and discipline them; (5) are more
likely to use incentive systems; (6) are less labor intensive (i.e., con-
tractors make greater use of more productive capital equipment); (7)
have younger work forces, with less seniority; and (8) have more
workers per supervisor. Stevens concluded that:
[I]n the majority of public agencies, the concepts of clear, precise
task definitions and job definitions, coupled with easily identifiable
responsibility for job requirements, are not enforced as vigorously
as in the majority of private enterprises. It is this difference that
18. Id.
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appears, in general, to be responsible for the very significant public
sector-private sector cost differences.' 9
C. Employee Concerns About Privatization
Not surprisingly, the dreaded 'P' word arouses strong passions and
understandable fears among public employees and public administra-
tors, but privatization does not necessarily mean that current employ-
ees will be unemployed. Many approaches are used to avoid this
result. First, the rate of privatization can be matched to the rate of
normal attrition. Second, a winning contractor can be contractually
obligated, when staffing up to assume work on a new contract, to offer
openings first to current government employees that are affected.
Third, a freeze on outside hiring can be instituted in other agencies
and the affected workers can be retrained and absorbed preferentially
in these agencies. And finally, early retirement and severance pay can
be used to mitigate the effects of privatization on individual workers.
Moreover, privatization can create profitable opportunities for pub-
lic employees who start their own companies, or for those who buy
out the public agency and perform the functions they were responsible
for as public employees. In these instances, government-owned capi-
tal equipment and facilities (for example, vehicles and garages) could
be leased to such firms. Initially such firms might be awarded con-
tracts noncompetitively, but subsequently they would have to com-
pete fairly against other private firms. In Los Angeles, employees at a
county health clinic formed a private company and successfully bid
for county work. Following this approach, workers have prospered
dramatically in England through cost-cutting knowledge, and also
from a change in incentives precipitated by private ownership.20
VI. Mandatory Competition
New York City and other urban centers should adopt a policy re-
quiring competitive bidding for a large, specified list of government
functions and services that are, or can be, provided by commercial
firms in the private sector. This should be done in a carefully phased,
multi-year process, similar to that adopted by the United Kingdom.2'
Existing public agencies and private firms should be eligible to com-
pete against each other in a fair and equitable process. The full cost of
the public agency's bid must be calculated, as attested to by an impar-
19. Id.
20. See Young, supra note 3.
21. Id.
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tial third party such as the city comptroller, the state deputy comp-
troller for the city or the budget director. This bid should be
compared to the total cost of the private alternative, which equals the
bid price plus the government agency's cost of contract administra-
tion, monitoring and enforcement, minus the taxes that would be paid
by the private firm for doing this work. The contract should be
awarded to the lowest bidder, public or private, and the winning con-
tractor, public or private, should be held to the same standard of per-
formance as specified in the contract. Note that this does not require
contracting out to the private sector, but instead mandates legitimate
competition between public agencies and private firms where the con-
tract is awarded to the bidder who offers the best proposal.
In Great Britain, for example, the following local services must, by
national law, be offered for competitive bidding: refuse collection,
street cleaning, cleaning of public buildings, vehicle maintenance
grounds maintenance and catering (including school meals). Gradu-
ally phased-in over a five-year period starting in 1988, Great Britain's
privatization project results are encouraging, with large reported sav-
ings even when city units win the bidding and the work remains in-
house, because the city agencies reduce their costs under the spur of
competition.
Similar results have been achieved in the United States. The City of
Phoenix, Arizona, adopted a competitive policy similar to Great Brit-
ain's.22 The government divided the city into districts and gradually
introduced competitive bidding in one district after another. Initially,
private firms won most of the city's contracts, but after several years,
facing near extinction, the city agencies started adopting the same
productive practices employed by the private firms, and the refuse
collection agency, for example, won back all the districts.
Bus operations and refuse collection represent two areas where
New York could take advantage of this tested approach. In the
Transit Authority's bus operations, drivers who retire or otherwise
leave should not be replaced. Instead, the extensive private transpor-
tation industry should be utilized. Late-night service should be
opened for competition with van operators allowed to bid against the
Transit Authority. Vans should also be allowed to bid to perform
some of the rush hour work, especially because many riders already
prefer them to buses. As for the existing private, franchised, local bus
routes that are operated currently by the Green, Command, Jamaica,
22. Ronald W. Jensen, Public/private Competition: The Phoenix Approach to Priva-
tization, Before the Subcomm. on Small Business of the House Comm. on the Impact of
Deregulation and Privatization.
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Queens and Triborough Companies, these should be opened to com-
petitive bidding, rather than treated as perpetual franchises. After
several years of this process, savings are estimated to reach about
$500 million per year, with no layoffs, as the rate of privatization
would be no higher than the rate of attrition.2 3
With respect to refuse collection, an analogous procedure should be
followed. Attrition in the Department of Sanitation is about five per-
cent per year. This means that the equivalent of three of the city's
fifty-nine sanitation districts lose all their personnel each year. Again,
competitive bidding should be introduced for up to three districts per
year. Savings of at least $70 million can be anticipated. As for the
exaggerated fear that criminal elements would be involved, one
should note that a large array of firms would compete, including ma-
jor, publicly traded American, Canadian, British and French
companies.
To accommodate labor concerns, it is evident that the Taylor Law24
would have to be modified after negotiations with public employee
unions. In fact, competitive bidding did not become feasible in Cali-
fornia until the labor law was changed in 1978 to allow widespread
privatization in Los Angeles and other areas to begin operating one
year later. Nonetheless, legislation to eliminate barriers to privatiza-
tion will be enacted only when the political will exists to do so, and
when the alternatives of higher taxes or lower quality services become
sufficiently unpalatable.
Regardless of these barriers, it is clear that mandatory competitive
bidding would bring the advantages of marketplace competition to
public services. Indeed, large savings can be anticipated. Even with
only twenty-five percent of city activities subject to competitive bid-
ding, conservative estimates suggest a savings of at least twenty per-
cent. This amounts to a five percent combined total savings in New
York City's budget, or $1.5 billion. Additional savings of $500 mil-
lion could be realized from Transit Authority bus operations and
would bring the total to $2 billion annually.
IV. Conclusion
New York is not trapped between a rock and a hard place. The city
does not have to choose between raising taxes or cutting services.
There is a third way and that is to increase productivity - to give
23. E.S. SAV/AS, SIGURD GRAVA & ROY SPARROW, THE PRIVATE SECTOR IN PUB-
LIC TRANSPORTATION IN NEW YORK CITY (Institute of Transportation Systems, CUNY
1991).
24. N.Y. CIV. SERV. LAW §§ 200-214 (McKinney 1988).
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citizens more for their tax dollars. As numerous cities have demon-
strated, prudent privatization creates competition, which is the key to
unlocking the productivity potential of both the public and private
sectors.
Public agencies and private firms should have to compete for the
privilege of providing public services and thereby earning the taxpay-
ers' money. Most taxpayers earn their livelihoods - and thus pay for
government - by working for firms that compete in the marketplace
every day. This common practice should be extended to government
services which lend themselves to this approach.
Publicly owned businesses, such as the airports and New York
City's Off-Track Betting Corporation, that are naturally commercial
activities and have no inherently "governmental" character, can
safely and profitably be operated by the private sector. The same can
be said for many infrastructure projects. Introducing effective compe-
tition in Medicaid and appropriately deregulating the Medicaid pro-
gram, education and housing in New York City will unleash market
forces that can overcome the serious problems affecting these areas.
Competitive bidding will drive down the cost of bus transportation,
solid waste management and scores of other routine services.
In addition to enhancing the productivity and effectiveness of city
services, privatization will serve one final and essential purpose: it will
allow city government to return to the business of governing. The
word "govern" comes from the Greek word meaning "to steer." In
other words, the true role of government is to steer, not to row. Oper-
ating buses, airports and waste water treatment plants, and collecting
trash are merely rowing, activities for which the private sector is bet-
ter suited. A competitive private sector, working under proper public
control, can perform such chores better and more cheaply. By con-
trast, only government can be entrusted with the task of steering.
Thus, privatization can relieve government of mundane commercial
tasks and restore it to its fundamental purpose - governing - which
in New York is a sufficiently large challenge. Privatization, properly
applied, leads to a better division of responsibilities between the public
and private sectors, takes advantage of the strengths of each sector,
and avoids their weaknesses. The result is better and less costly serv-
ices to the public, lower taxes and better government.
[Vol. XIX
